Armies and Enemies of Imperial Rome

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Armies and Enemies of Imperial Rome

1.          Introduction

This essay discusses and analyzes The Battle of Pharsalus. This battle took place on ninth of August 48 BC at Pharsalus in Greece and was fought between the army of Julius Caesar on one hand and that of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus or Pompey on the other hand. This war was important as it defined the outcome of Caesar’s Civil War[1].

In this essay, discussion and analysis of the battle is essentially done based on several ancient texts. A few modern texts are however referenced in the essay.  The strategic context of the war is first discussed and the opposing armies described. A detailed look at the causes of the war is provided and the setting of the war described. Next, tactical issues such as army composition, army deployment and nature of the battlefield, the course of the battle, leadership and morale, and the outcome of the battle are discussed and analyzed. An in-depth look at the reasons for the outcome of the battle and the strategic consequences of the battle is also given.

2.          The Strategic Context of the War

2.1.   The Opposing Armies

The Battle of Pharsalus was fought between the armies of Julius Caesar and Pompey¹.

2.2.   Causes of the War:

The war was mainly caused by the need to control of the Roman republic. The two protagonists arrayed against each other were Julius Caesar who was the Pontifex Maximus and Pompey[2]. The two were the faces behind the dominant political movements of the day. Whereas Caesar was the leader of the optimates, Pompey led the populares. The optimates were bankrolled by the senators and aristocrats of Rome while the populares drew its membership from the ordinary folk who included farmers, middle class citizens, and war veterans. Thus, the war can be categorized as a class struggle^{1, 2}.

The war was fought in Greece. Specifically, it took place at Pharsalus in the Enipeus Valley. Pompey had set up camp at Mount Dogantzes in the Enipeus Valley and Caesar drew his lines close by. The two sides were separated by River Enipeus. The war was fought here because Pompey and the senate had fled Rome^{1, 2}.

3.     Tactical Issues

3.1.   The Composition of the Armies

In total, Caesar’s army was composed of eighty cohorts, translating to about twenty two thousand men. The composition of Caesar’s army included Corfinius and his two legions, fifteen cohorts under Calenus, and legions of war veterans. The Dyrrachian war had seriously eroded Caesar’s army hence the lower number of men. During the Battle of Pharsalus, Caesar’s army was organized as follows. The Tenth legion was on the right wing and was under the command of P. Sulla. The Ninth legion was on the left wing and was commanded by Antonius. The Eighth legion was added to the ninth legion as the latter was small. Eighty cohorts were posted in Caesar’s lines while seven cohorts were reserved and their duty was to protect the camp. Gnaeus Domitius commanded the center[3].

On the other hand, Pompey’s army was about twice as bigger as that of Caesar. According to accounts, Pompey’s army had close to forty five thousand men. The forty five thousand men were organized into eleven legions and one hundred and ten cohorts. The army also had two thousand reserves procured from the beneficiaries of his former armies. The First and Third legions in Pompey’s army had been handed over to Pompey by Caesar at the beginning of the civil strife by decree of the senate. During the Battle of Pharsalus, Pompey’s army included Scipio and the Syrian legions, the Cilician legion, and seven cohorts placed on garrison duty in the camp and the neighboring forts. There were also cavalries, archers, and slingers.

In the Battle of Pharsalus, Pompey had an advantage over Caesar. Not only was his army bigger than Caesar’s but also he had better supplies than Caesar whose provisions were scant. Additionally, Pompey possessed ground that was higher than Caesar’s. Pompey’s camp was situated atop a hill while Caesar’s was on lower ground. Thus, Pompey was well placed to monitor the movements of Caesar’s army and constantly drew hisline on the lowest spurs of the mountain in a bid to ascertain whether Caesar would approach close up to the unfavorableground. On the other hand, the disadvantaged Caesar determined that it would be impossible to entice Pompey out of the hill into a battle and therefore resorted to be on the march always. This would allow him to get his supplies conveniently and wear down Pompey who was not used to hard work³.

Weapons and equipment used in the battle consisted of javelins, swords, slings, bows and arrows, spears, and horses. The use of slings and bows and arrows is evidenced by the presence of slingers and archers respectively. To conclude this section, it is noted that Caesar was at a disadvantaged position than Pompey³.

3.2.   The Armies’ Deployment and the Nature of the Battlefield

The battle was fought in a rough terrain in Pharsalus situated in Thessaly, Greece. The battlefield was a rough terrain and consisted of a mountain, a river, and a plain. The mountain, Mount Dogantzes, served as the camp of Pompey’s army. Caesar’s army camped a few miles away from the foot of the mountain in a plain. A stream joining the Enipeus River separated the two camps as depicted in the diagram below. The stream had difficult banks and this was used by Pompey to protect his right wing.

Deployment of the troops was as follows. With regard to Caesar’s army, the Tenth legion was on the right wing and was commanded by P. Sulla. The Ninth legion was on the left wing and was commanded by Antonius. The Eighth legion was added to the ninth legion as the latter was small. Eighty cohorts were posted in Caesar’s lines while seven cohorts were reserved and their duty was to protect the camp. Gnaeus Domitius commanded the center. On the other hand, Pompey’s army of eleven legions and one hundred and ten cohorts had The First and Third legions next to Pompey. The middle of the line was occupied by Scipio and the Syrian legions. The Cilician legion was merged with the Spanish cohorts and occupied the right wing. Other legions were stationed between the centre and the wings. There were also two thousand reserves distributed throughout the force and seven cohorts on garrison duty in the camp and the neighboring forts[4].

3.3.   Leadership and Morale

      The outcome of the Battle of Pharsalus was largely determined by the leadership and morale of the fighters. In a great part, Caesar managed to motivate his troops despite the obvious disadvantages they were at. He constantly talked to them and encouraged them to retain their loyalty and fight bravely. He even referred to signs as evidence that the heavens had ordained their victory and this motivated his troops in no small measure. Besides, he had loyal soldiers such as G. Triarius who helped to motivate the troops, especially the young inexperienced fighters who formed a large percentage of the army[5].

3.4.   Outcome of the Battle

The battle was finally won by Caesar. After the battle, Pompey fled to Egypt and was later killed following orders from the Egyptian monarch. A vast number of Pompey’s soldiers were killed. It is estimated that those who surrendered to Caesar were twenty four thousand and that the rest died in battle. The number of soldiers from Pompey’s army who died is estimated at fifteen thousand. Casualties from Caesar’s side have been put at two hundred from the ranks and thirty centurions. This victory enabled Caesar to establish his autocracy over Rome and was the beginning of the end of the long drawn Civil War^3,4,5.        

3.5.   Reasons for the Outcome of the Battle

The battle was won by Caesar despite the obvious disadvantages he had. As already discussed, Pompey had all the advantages going into war. Not only was his army bigger but also he had better supplies, was well equipped, and occupied a vantage position. There are several reasons why Pompey lost the battle.The first reason is that Pompey’s strategy was poor. Though he had the resources to take down Caesar and bludgeon him into submission, he instead chose to block supplies to Caesar’s army and starve the enemy to submission. He reasoned that Caesar’s fighters had become old and physically unfit to wage a successful war. He also knew that Caesar’s army had been ravaged by a strange disease that had wiped out his soldiers and severely weakened many of Caesar’s fighters. He also knew that Caesar lacked provisions, equipment, and funds to wage any successful battle. Based on these reasons, Pompey and his men thought that it was just a matter of time before Caesar’s army broke down on its own and capitulated. Thus, he saw no valid reason for putting up a fight^3,4,5.

Ordinarily, Pompey should have maintained the tempo created by his successes in the battles of Dyrrachium and taken the war to Caesar. In a sense, Pompey waited too long and this gave Caesar time to regroup and strategize. Upon resolving to fight, Pompey seems to have got his strategy altogether wrongly. He chose to fight a pitched battle and had previously spoken in the council of war and announced that his army would vanquish Caesar’s army before the meeting of the lines. This strategy is captured in the following words:

“I have induced my cavalry — and they have assured me that they will do it — as soon as the two armies have drawn nearer, to attack Caesar's right wing on his open flank, and by surrounding his column from the rear to drive his army in confused rout before a weapon is cast at the foe by us. So we shall finish the war without imperilling the legions and almost without a wound. And this is not difficult, considering that we are so strong in cavalry."³.

Even this promise sounded incredible to Pompey himself as he expresses his incredulity at it. However, he lets optimism get in his way. This optimism replaces pragmatism, attests to the poor strategy, and ultimately costs him the battle. Pompey’s commanders and fighters acquiesced to this strategy. Those who strongly supported this strategy included experienced fighters such as Labienus and they took oaths and swore to vanquish the enemy. These actions and a general lack of critical assessment of the strategy betray a lack of foresight on the part of Pompey’s camp and it seems that members of Pompey’s camp all seemed to want to curry favor with their commander and none seemed ready to take a contrary opinion. Importantly also, only Cato spoke in support of Pompey before the decision to fight Caesar was made. All the other men in his camp reviled Pompey for avoiding a fight and it is only with reluctance that he decided to finally square off with Caesar^3,4,5.

On the other hand, Caesar was more calculating and strategic. Despite limited resources and a blockade on supplies, he was able to arrange for a supply of corn and took to encouraging his fighters all the time. He gathered intelligence beforehand on the capacity of Pompey’s army and their fighting spirit by leading out his army and drawing lines in favorable positions and at short distances from Pompey’s camp. Subsequently, he pushed further away from his lines and into the foothills occupied by Pompey. Not only did this increase his fighters’ confidence but it also showed him the fighting disposition of Pompey. Caesar’s army, as noted before, was largely composed on inexperienced youth who had seen little or any war action. However, Caesar used this disadvantage to his benefit. The youths were hungrier for success and Caesar took the lightly equipped youths to the frontline. The youths were given light weapons and this enhanced their speed. Through daily escapades, the youth gained invaluable war experience and this enabled just one thousand men from Caesar’s army to successfully face off with seven thousand fighters from Pompey’s army^3,4,5.

Approaching Pompey’s camp allowed Caesar to determine how Pompey’s army was organized. He noted the positions of the First and Third legions, that of Scipio and the Syrian legions, the Cilician legion, Spanish cohorts brought by Afranius, and other important details about Pompey’s army. This information allowed him to come up with a strategy to vanquish Pompey. Still on strategy, Caesar moved his camp from place to place since he rightly determined that Pompey was not keen on fighting but only wanted to starve Caesar’s forces. Thus, Caesar’s army was always marching. This not only enabled Caesar’s army to replenish its supplies but also helped his army to wear down Pompey’s army through intermittent and constant skirmishes. Here, it should be noted that Pompey’s army was composed of relatively lazy fighters who were not as accustomed to hard work as Caesar’s men. Once the start signal had been issued and the tents become unstretched, Caesar’s army noted the advance of Pompey’s line and this made Caesar to realize that they could fight Pompey without being disadvantaged by the ground they held. He immediately addressed his fighters, encouraged them, and set them out to war. This illustrates the tactical brilliance of Caesar^3,4,5.

The second reason why Pompey lost the battle is due to overconfidence and complacency. The complacency and overconfidence was understandable because Pompey had an army that was twice the size of Caesar’s. Additionally, Pompey’s army had just defeated Caesar and it had very experienced fighters, good fighting equipment and weapons, a limitless supply, and well-fed horses. As also noted before, Pompey’s army had set camp on higher ground and were thus at a more vantage position than Caesar’s army. All these advantages fuelled the overconfidence in Pompey’s camp, making them to sit on their laurels and thereby allowing Caesar’s army space and time to strategize and regroup^3,4,5.

The third reason why Pompey was defeated by Caesar has to do with indiscipline among his forces. There was conflict between Lentulus Spintherr, Scipio, and Domitius who all desired to take over the position of Pontifex Maximus that was being held by Caesar. They engaged in public disputations with Lentulus campaigning on the basis of age, Domitius boasting of his dignity and urban sway, and Scipio canvassing for the position based on his own kinship with Pompey^3,4,5.

They were so confident of routing Caesar’s army and lost the plot, their entire being and ambition being focused instead on occupancy of this office. Besides the conflict between the three men over Caesar’s office, there was also a lot of disagreement in Pompey’s camp on how the fighters should be honored with altercations being fuelled by differences of opinion on the prizes, money or honor that should be accorded to them. Others bargained for the properties and houses belonging to Caesar’s camp and ferociously put their cases forward on why they should be apportioned these properties after the war. Thus, a lot of energy was expended on discussing matters that had very little to do with success of the war instead on focusing on the battle. This indiscipline made them lose their focus and ultimately cost them the war. While Pompey and his acolytes were concerned about honors and other material rewards, Caesar’s army maintained a high level of discipline and was fully focused on the battle ahead^3,4,5.

Another reason as to why Caesar won and Pompey lost has to do with the leadership qualities of the two men. Caesar had the ability to motivate his forces, was a hard worker, and took time to think through issues. He also had a spiritual side that gave him the courage and the morale to keep fighting and remain optimistic. We read of several encounters with seemingly supernormal occurrences or epiphenomena and these only serve to harden Caesar’s resolve to win the war. Seldom do we read or hear of factions in his camp and his men seem to be all focused on their tasks. On the other hand, Pompey lacked the ability to motivate his forces. Whereas he helps to put down dissent through compromises and a give and take attitude, he comes across as a weak leader who cannot take strong positions and make his men toe the line. Factions emerge all the time in his cam and this tends to make the camp lose its focus^3,4,5.

3.6.   Strategic consequences of the battle

The battle had several effects and consequences, the most important of which is that it led to an end to the Civil War and helped to restore order in Rome. It also helped to entrench Caesar’s autocracy. It also helped to redefine the global geopolitical landscape. The subjectivity of the writers is displayed in the texts and this might have distorted a few facts about the battle^3,4,5.

4.     Conclusion

      This essay discussed and analyzed The Battle of Pharsalus. It was noted that the battle took place in Pharsalus in central Greece in 48 BC and was between Julius Caesar who represented the farmers, middle class citizens, and veterans and Pompey who represented the Senate and the Roman aristocracy. Caesar’s army was composed of eighty cohorts, translating to about twenty two thousand men while Pompey’s army had close to forty five thousand men. Despite the obvious advantages possessed by Pompey’s army over Caesar’s, the former suffered a heavy defeat and fled to Egypt where he was later assassinated. Weapons and equipment used in the battle consisted of javelins, swords, slings, bows and arrows, spears, and horses. The use of slings and bows and arrows is evidenced by the presence of slingers and archers respectively. To conclude this section, it is noted that Caesar was at a disadvantaged position than Pompey. Pompey lost the battled due to infighting and indiscipline within his camp, poor strategy, and overconfidence.

References

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